International Journal of Computer Network and Information Security (IJCNIS)
IJCNIS Vol. 5, No. 4, 8 Apr. 2013
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Statistical Hiding Fuzzy Commitment Scheme for Securing Biometric Templates
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Author(s)
Alawi A. Al-Saggaf
1,2,*
Haridas Acharya
3
Index Terms
Cryptography, commitment schemes, fuzzy commitment scheme, error correcting codes, biometrics, and template security
Abstract
By considering the security flaws in cryptographic hash functions, any commitment scheme designed straight through hash function usage in general terms is insecure. In this paper, we develop a general fuzzy commitment scheme called an ordinary fuzzy commitment scheme (OFCS), in which many fuzzy commitment schemes with variety complexity assumptions is constructed. The scheme is provably statistical hiding (the advisory gets almost no statistically advantages about the secret message). The efficiency of our scheme offers different security assurance, and the trusted third party is not involved in the exchange of commitment.
The characteristic of our scheme makes it useful for biometrics systems. If the biometrics template is compromised, then there is no way to use it directly again even in secure biometrics systems. This paper combines biometrics and OFCS to achieve biometric protection scheme using smart cards with renewability of protected biometrics template property.
Cite This Paper
Alawi A. Al-Saggaf, Haridas Acharya, "Statistical Hiding Fuzzy Commitment Scheme for Securing Biometric Templates", International Journal of Computer Network and Information Security(IJCNIS), vol.5, no.4, pp.8-16, 2013. DOI:10.5815/ijcnis.2013.04.02
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